Hidden Costs Deepen: Why the Westinghouse Deal Further Weakens Korea’s Nuclear Future

 The controversy surrounding South Korea’s secretive nuclear agreement with Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC)doesn’t end with one-sided revenue sharing. Newly revealed details show that localization promises, soaring technology usage fees, and restrictions on SMR (Small Modular Reactor) exports make the deal even more damaging to Korea’s long-term nuclear competitiveness.

Localization Promises Cut Korea’s Share Even Further

In almost every nuclear construction contract, local participation quotas are guaranteed to the host nation. For the Czech Dukovany project, the so-called “Team Korea” reportedly promised Prague a 60% localization rate.

This means:

• Out of the ₩24 trillion ($18B) construction budget for two reactors, about ₩14 trillion ($10.5B) will go to Czech companies.

• Around ₩2 trillion ($1.5B) is guaranteed to Westinghouse.

• Leaving Korean companies with a far smaller slice than initially projected.

In essence, even though Seoul secured the project diplomatically, domestic firms will see limited economic returns once localization and Westinghouse’s guaranteed share are factored in.

Rising Technology Fees: A Step Backwards

One of the most controversial clauses is the $175 million per reactor technology fee. Unlike earlier agreements, this is not a one-time payment but a recurring charge every time Korea exports a nuclear plant.

For comparison:

• In 1997, KEPCO and KHNP signed a license agreement with ABB-CE (a Westinghouse predecessor), paying only $30 million over ten years for technology usage.

• The new deal requires nearly six times that amount per reactor, adjusted automatically for inflation starting in 2025.

Unsurprisingly, Cameco, the Canadian firm holding a 49% stake in Westinghouse, has seen its stock price jump nearly 50% this year, buoyed by the long-term profit guarantee embedded in Korea’s concessions.

SMR Exports Restricted by Westinghouse “Verification”

The agreement’s reach extends into the next-generation nuclear sector. It stipulates that even Korean-developed SMRs must undergo Westinghouse verification before being exported.

This clause threatens to choke off Korea’s ambitions in the fast-growing SMR market, projected to reach $300–400 billion by 2040.

• Unlike large reactors, SMRs (under 170 MW capacity) are modular, factory-built, and easily deployable.

• They are seen as a transformative technology for nations seeking cost-effective, scalable clean energy.

• Korea has been developing its own i-SMR model, targeting overseas exports by 2030.

But with Westinghouse holding a gatekeeper role, Korean firms may find themselves blocked from independently competing in one of the most promising energy markets of the future.

Conclusion: A Deal That Locks in Dependence

What was once touted as a $24 trillion Czech nuclear victory may prove to be a hollow win. With localization promises reducing Korea’s share, inflation-tied fees enriching Westinghouse, and SMR exports handcuffed by verification clauses, the deal increasingly looks like a long-term concession of nuclear sovereignty rather than a triumph.

South Korea has positioned itself as a global leader in nuclear exports. Yet, by signing away so much to Westinghouse, it risks being remembered not for expanding its energy independence, but for selling off the future of its nuclear industry.